INTRODUCTION 2 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 3 TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM-LEVEL FLIGHT
System-level flight tests provide data that are needed to assess the performance of the weapon systems that comprise the US nuclear deterrent.
Measurements made cooperatively by the Departments of Energy and Defense on the Joint Test Assemblies (JTAs) provide unique opportunities to monitor the interactions and performance of sub-systems over the relevant operational flight conditions, and to search for failure modes not otherwise detectable.
System-level flight testing is not prohibited by the CTBT. Indeed, the need for such tests is largely independent of the CTBT, as they address the integrated performance of components and subsystems that cannot be probed by underground nuclear tests (UGTs) The special value of each system-level flight test derives from its being a review of the integrated performance of the delivery system and many functions of the warhead or bomb, in a realistic sequence from the launch of the delivery system to the arrival of the weapon at the target. The test includes the delivery system and a test unit version of the warhead or bomb.
The JTA measurements in flight environments have thus far been primarily limited to the functioning of the non-nuclear components, including restricted exercising of the gas-transfer systems, with the mass and moment of inertia properties of the nuclear explosive package (NEP) being mocked up in the instrumented flight tests. Recent flight tests without instrumentation provided limited data on the functioning of the NEP (with substitutes for special nuclear materials). Insofar as the present report to DOE is concerned with DOD issues, our remarks can be taken as a recommendation for DOE to carry these issues to DOD.
The study:
1) Endorses the current efforts to develop Enhanced Fidelity Instrumentation (EFI). While useful for monitoring or diagnosing potentially serious problems, the new EFI will enhance our understanding of the overall functional and structural performance of the system. The new EFI program will include the development both of sophisticated, miniaturized new sensors, some of which could become part of the WR units, and of new telemetry capabilities. New EFI must be thoroughly debugged in ground tests, and very high confidence established that they will not give rise to false positives, or false alarms, before being introduced into system-level flight tests.
2) Recommends the development of a strong ground-based program of testing that would complement and be fully integrated with the essential end-to-end flight testing, provide system-level tests that can be used to plan and analyze the results of flight tests, and help to develop remedies to any problems uncovered by the system-level tests.
3) Recommends exercise of all non-nuclear components under STS conditions as part of the HFJTAs. Should they malfunction, the weapon will fail. of and opportunity for high-fidelity tests. In particular, the MMIII missile will be converted from a three-RV system to a single-RV system, and it will require modification of the PBV for the MMIII.
One suggestion is that any new PBV be made large enough to carry telemetry transmitters, most of the battery power for the on-RV sensors, six-degree-of-freedom position, velocity and attitude sensors (e.g., GPS, accelerometers, gyroscopes), and some thrusting capability. The new PBV would fly attached to the RV until shortly before re-entry, when it would do its usual job of releasing the RV; then it would back off some distance, maintaining with its thrusters a separation large enough to avoid interference with the RV but small enough so that small battery-powered transmitters on the RV could continue to send data to the PBV for relay to the ground.
These new PBV functions could be a part of the WR PBV, not simply an add-on for JTA flights. Because there would be substantially less intrusion into the RV itself, this could make it considerably easier to implement the vision in which every JTA flight is high-fidelity. As the development of a new PBV is a D)D function, the DOE should consult with DOD in this matter.
International treaty requirements substantially complicate the issue of telemetry. Our understanding is that no telemetry can be encrypted, and that data in all individual telemetry channels (though not their actual physical significance) must be readable by other countries, for example Russia.
Thus, a risk/benefit analysis must precede the actual fielding of any particular channel in order to determine whether the knowledge gained by the US is worth the loss of knowledge to others, who may be able to infer technical information about the weapon from the channel. Also, we must be prepared to furnish technical information about telemetry itself (e.g. modulation scheme, channelization) to the Russians.
Ground-Test Component of the System-Level Flight Test Program
The greatest concern to arise in the present study is on the adequacy of 
General Description of a Ground-Test Component
A ground-based experimental program should ideally include the following: 
Relative Merits of Flight and Ground Testing
There are, of course, critical environments that cannot be simulated in ground-based or component tests. To achieve these, there is no substitute for end-to-end system-level flight tests. These critical environments are:
penetrator bombs are also very high, but are easily attained by dropping the weapon as it would normally be used.
Because of the limitations of ground testing there will be times when it is essential to test a system end-to-end, even though the critical subsystems under investigation could be thoroughly ground-tested. Such ground tests should still be carried out before flight tests, and should reproduce the above four critical environments as closely as possible.
Weapons scheduled for disassembly are good candidates for such ground tests. Every year, eleven of each type of stockpile weapon system are examined, the NEP of one of which is thoroughly disassembled and is therefore a good candidate to check for problems (e.g., aging effects) which could arise during the course of normal stockpile storage. Numerous other weapons, some of them representing types that are not scheduled to remain in the enduring stockpile, are also disassembled to meet treaty limits. A suggestion is that these weapons be subjected, after partial disassembly and certain other steps, to thorough system-level ground tests. 2 The actual tests performed will depend on whether the weapon is being retired or is intended to be returned to the active stockpile. For retired weapons of types remaining in the enduring stockpile, the primary and CSA can be replaced with high-fidelity test assemblies. All non-nuclear functions, such as arming, fuzing and detonator firing, can be tested with appropriate inputs mimicking those received from launch systems and environmental inputs. One could go so far as to detonate the high explosive, for example in one or two disassemblies each year. It is not clear how far one can go with weapons to be returned to the active stockpile, but there are no real barriers evident to system tests with JTA high-fidelity NEP components, after which the weapon would be reassembled with WR parts. System-level flight tests provide two distinct but equally important types of information: 1) an integral test of the weapon system from launch through to the arming of the (inerted) nuclear device; and 2) data on the temperatures, accelerations, deflections and other aspects of the physical environment experienced by the components inside the warhead throughout the entire operational profile. There is an unavoidable tension between these two sets of objectives. For the first, the highest priority is to make as few changes to the system as absolutely necessary, the aim being to measure overall performance for a weapon system closely mimicking the war reserve (WR) unit. For the second, the goal is to extract the maximum amount of data possible from each test, which means the placement of large numbers of sensors and telemetry hardware inside the missile and RV, a process that necessarily requires changes to war reserve components. In either case, one modification that is always made is to remove the fissile material and replace it by non-fissile material, such as depleted uranium.
The present study was presented with the question of how one should choose in the tradeoff between these two objectives, fidelity of the test versus quantity and quality of data. It is concluded that there is no single choice that should be made, but that the best solution is to maintain a range of approaches between the two extremes. A well designed program should always include at least one of the highest-fidelity (potentially data poorer)
tests for each weapon-system type over a multi-year cycle (say 3-5 years), the reason being that such tests are uniquely valuable. More data-rich tests, which are potentially lower in fidelity, should also be pursued but with great care that these are not duplicating studies that could be performed on the ground, whether on components or the entire system. Indeed, these more data-rich flight tests should be planned and their results analyzed in the light of ground-based tests that have explored and exceeded the limits of performance of the system. Flight tests should not be used as a principal means of evaluating individual components, if for no other reason than that the statistics would be meaningless.
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